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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

Compromise of Debt.-Payment of a portion of a liquidated demand,
in the same manner as the debtor was legally bound to pay the whole
,hereof, although it be received in satisfaction of the debt, is payment
only in part; the agreement to receive such part payment in satisfaction
is, in effect, one to give up the residue of the demand, which, being
without consideration, is nudum pactum, and Void: Bliss et al.v. Shwarts,
64 Barb.
But a debtor may offer anything as a substitute for the money due,
whether of less or greater value; and if the creditor take it in satisfac.
tion, it is a valid agreement, and the debt is discharged. The obliga.
tion of a third person, for any amount, operates in the same way, to discharge the debt: Id.
The plaintiffs and defendant agreed upon a compromise of a debt
owing to the former by the latter, whereby the defendant was to pay
twenty-five cents on the dollar, and $350 in addition. The plaintiffs
received a negotiable bill of exchange, drawn by third persons, for s
part of the debt, and the defendant's note for another portion, and in
consideration thereof signed a receipt, stating that the same were "in
full settlement of their claims" against the defendant. Held, that thip
was a sufficient consideration to uphold the discharge: Id.
ACTION.

Parties-Prviesin Estate-Lis Pendens.-One cannot be a privy in
estate to a judgment or decree unless he derives his title to the property
in question subsequent to: and from some party who is bound by, such
judgment or decree: Hunt v. Haven & A., 4dministrators,52 N. H.
W. mortgaged a farm to B., and afterwards mortgaged the same farm
t S.: after the mortgage to S., B. and N" had a long litigation in
regard to the land conveyed in the mortgage to B., in which B. prevailed,
and obtained possession of the land. Held that S. was not a privy in
estate with W. to the judgment in that case, so as to be bound or affected
by it, but that he might, in a writ of entry ag-ainst B. founded upon his
mortgage, litigate the same questions which had been litigated and
decided in the suit B. v. W.: Id.
The fact that S. may have known of the pendency of the proceeding
between B. v. W., and may have aided W. in his suit, and even emI From J. B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 37 Ind. Rep.

2 From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 10 Kansas Reports.
3 From J. M. Snirley, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 52 N. H. Rep.
4 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 64 of his heports.
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ployed and paid counsel to assist W. in the suit with B., does not make
S. either a party or a privy in estate with W., so that he will be bound
by the judgment in that suit: Id.
A lispendens is not a notice to anybody to affect or operate upon existing rights. But the institution of a suit for the recovery of a specific
property, is held in equity to be notice to a purchaser so as to affect and
bind his interests in the decree, when such purchase is made yendente
lite, and from a party to such suit; and the lis pendens begins from the
service of the subpcena after the bill is filed: Id.
AGENT.
seems, that an agent employed to let premises and colPower f.-It
lect the rents, has no authority to consent to the substitution of a new
tenant, and the discharge of the original lessee; that not being within
the ordinary scope of such an agent's authority: Wilson v. Lester et al,
64 Barb.
AssuMPsIT.
Joinder of several Partiesin several Rights.-A., B. and C. intrusted
with D., a dealer in horses, one horse each, belonging to them individually, to be sold. D. sold the three horses together to the defendants,
on credit, for 6650,-no separate price being made for either of them
in the trade. The three individual owners afterwards joined in an action
of assumpsit against the purchaser to recover the price. Hehl, that the
action could not be maintained: Woodward v. Sherman, 52 N. H.
ATTORNEY.

See FAidence

Pritneged Communications.-In an action against the grantees in a
deed, upon a covenant therein that they would assume and pay certain
specified encumbrances, as portions of the purchase-money, an attorney
and counsel, who drew the deed, cannot be asked whether the deed was
read over to the grantees, after it was drawn, and whether the question
was up, then, as to whether the grantees would be personally liable on
the deed. Such questions are improper, as calling for privileged communications between attorney and client: Rogers v. Lyon et al., 64 Barb.
.Lien-Riglit of Set-off.-On a motion by the receiver of a bank,
against partners, to compel the payment of moneys in their hands, which
they have collected as attorneys for the bank, or for the receiver after
his appointment, one of the partners cannot set off a claim due to him
individually from the bank: Bowling Green Savings Bank v. Todd et al.,
64 Barb.
Nor has he any lien upon the papers on which a foreclosure suit is
brought by the firm of which he is a. member, or upon the moneys
which are the result of that suit, to secure the payment of his individual
claim: Td.
But attorneys, in whose hands a bond and mortgage are placed, by a
bank, for collection, acquire a lien thereon for any money due to them
for services rendered to the bank; which lien will not be defeated by
the subsequent appointment of a receiver of the bank: Id.
BANK. See Ufsury.
Bmx~s AND NOTES. See Evidence; Husband and Wife.
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CARRIER.

7
See S ipper.

Ltmzrattom of Liability-NWotice.-It is well settled in New York that
it is lawful for common carriers to limit, Iby a contract with their
shippers, the extent of their liability for loss or damage on the articles
conveyed: Fibel v. Livingston, .Pres't,&c.,64 Barb.
A notice at the head of a receipt given by an express company, for
freight, stating that shippers must have the value of their packages
inserted in such receipt, otherwise the company will not be responsible
for an amount over $50, is insufficient to constitute a contract where it
is not proven to have been brought to the kn wledge of the shipper: Id.
The plaintiff on delivering to the defendant, a common carrier, goods
for transportation, received a bill of lading, or receipt, containing a provision that the plaintiff should not demand, in any event, beyond the
sum of $50, at which the goods forwarded were thereby valued, unless
otherwise therein expressed, or unless specially insured by the carrier,
and so specified in the receipt. The plaintiff accepted such bill of
lading without making any objection to its terms, or giving any statement of the value of the property, or informing the carrier of his inability to read, or applying for any information as to the contents of such
bill. Held, that the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff, under
this contract, was limited to $50 and interestI: Id.
Held, also, that, under the circumstances, the fact that the plaintiff
was unable to read the contract, could make no difference: Id.
CHECKS.

Certifying-Forgeryof.-The defendant certified a check drawn upon
it as being good. The plaintiff took the cleck in the ordinary course
of business, for value, and in good faith; and the check turned out to
be a forgery. Held, that the bank was liable to make good its certificate,
by paying the check: ITagen v. The Bower.y National Bank, 64 Barb.
Whether the endorsement, purporting to be that of the payee named
in the check, was genuine or not; or whether the person so named is a
fictitious person; is immaterial. There can be no real payee of a forged
instrument: Id.
As between the holder and the bank, the liability of the latter attaches
upon the check being certified. And it being impossible to make title
to money payable upon a forged check, through an endorsement thereof.
proof of the genuineness of the endorsement is unnecessary for that
purpose: Id.
Where the evidence showed that the person from whom the plaintiff
received the check went by the name endorsed thereon, and that the
endorsement was made by him; Held, that this was quite sufficient to
protect the plaintiff against any imputation of negligence or bad faith in
taking the check: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Legislature.-Although an act of the legislature be unconstitutional.
the legislature may, by a subsequent act, direct the expenses incurred
Dy such legislation to be paid: The People e ret
e Kingsland v. Bradley,
64 Barb.
The power of the legislature is omnipotent, within constitutional
limits, and the good of the greatest number is regarded by the legisla
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ture as its justification for the extraordinary use of its power: The
1'eople v. The New York Gas Company, 64 Barb.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Accord and atsfactna.

DEED.
Tax Title.-Under the laws of 1862 a deputy county clerk could
execute a valid tax deed: Whitford v. Lynch, 10 Kans.
DIVORCE.

See Husband and Wife.

Domior.
Domicil is controlled by intention. The intention is evidenced, often,
by circumstances attending a residence, as well as by declarations:
Dupuy v. Seymour, 64 Barb.
It seems, that there is no arbitrary rule by which the domicil of a
erson is proven. Each case must be decided according to the particuar facts and circumstances which surround it: Id.
The domicil of birth or origin continues until it is proven to have been
abandoned, or a new one has been obtained: d.
Where the testatrix in a will executed abroad, was formerly settled,
and her domicil, for many years, was with her husband, at the city of
New York, Held, That it rested with those contesting the will to prove
that the testatrix had ever formed the intention of changing her domicil; or that the facts and circumstances of the case were entirely inconsistent with an intention to retain her original domicil: Id.
ERROR.

Appeal in Crminal Cases-RepealingStatutes.-A criminal case must
be removed from the District Court to the Supreme Court on appeal,
and not on petition in error: Boyle v. State of Kansas, 10 Kans.
When a statute is repealed and the repealing statute is silent as tc
whether the rights and remedies which have accrued under the repealed statute shall be abrogated or not, sect. 1 of the "Act concerning
the construction of statutes," (Gen. Stat. 998), will have the force and
effect to save and preserve all such rights and remedies whether they
belong to the state or to individuals, and in criminal as well as in civil
cases, and a criminal action pending finder the repealed statute at the
time it is repealed may be prosecuted by virtue of said saving statute
to final determination and judgment, notwithstanding said repeal. Id
A question not raised by the record will not be considered by the
Supreme Court, although defendant's-counsel may desire to have it considered. Id.
Exclusion of Ezidence.-Where the execution and existence of e
written instrument is admitted by the pleadings, the Supreme Court
will not reverse a judgment of the District Court for excluding evidence
"nproof of such written instrument, although the court may have ex.
cluded such evidence for a wrong reason: Reed v. Arnold, 10 Kans.
EVIDENCE.

See Mortgage.

Declarationsof Ownership.-Declarations of one in the possession of
personal property that it is owned by another are competent evidence
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in favor of the person declared to be the owner, against an officer who
has attached it as the property of the declarant: Putnam v. Osgood, 52
N.H.
Explanationof Delivery of Draft.-Evidence to explain under what
circumstances a draft on one officer of a railroad company was accepted
by another officer of the same company, and delivered to tle plaintiff
having an account against the company, is admissible, there being an
averment in the complaint that the draft was not delivered or received
as payment. Such evidence does not contradict the tenor of the draft:
CMcago, C. and L. Railroad Co. v. West, 37Ind.
Admissions-Attorney.-In a suit by an attorney for his services, it
is proper for him to testify as a witness to admissions made by tl-e defendants, as to the amount realized by his successful defence of the action in
which he was employed by them: MlcNiel et al. v. Davidson, 31 Ind.
There is no error in excluding evidence of a witness as to the value
of services rendered by an attorney in a case, from his knowledge of
what the services were, when he hasstated that he cannot say what a reasonable fee would be; nor is it error to exclude such testimony, when it
has not been shown that the witness offered i's competent to state such
value. Other persons, having knowledge on the subject, are competent
witnesses, as well as lawyers. But a mere opinion is not evidence. There
must be knowledge of facts which will give value to the opinion: Id.
Partnership-Delarations.-Inan action against several persons as
partners, the declarations, verbal or written, of one of them, who admits
himself to be a partner, are not admissible to prove that another is a
member of the firm : Johnson v. Gallivan, 52 N. H.
But where the question was whether a copartnership between A. and
B. had been dissolved, and there was evidence tending to show that the
business had been carried on the same after the alleged dissolution as
before, a receipt signed by A. with his own t. me, and that of B. in B.'s
presence, given for money paid in a transaction commenced befire the
alleged dissolution, with which B. was familiar, is admissible in evidence,
although B. could neither read nor write. And a verdict will not be set
aside because the jury were not directed to consider the receipt only in
case they found that B. was aware of its contents, and knew that. hir
name was signed to it, no special request for such instruction being
made: Id.
Where it was proved that a letter, in the possession of a third person,
after being shown to and read by a party to the suit, was kept by the
person to whom it was addressed, who was out of the country at the
time of the trial; it was held, that this was sufficient evidence to warrant parol proof of its contents : Tucker et al. v. Woolsey et al., 64 Barb
Written Instrument-Admission by Pleading.-Where a copy of a
written instrument may be used the original may be used: Rm.a, v.
Arnold, 10 Kans.
Where an action is brought upon a written instrument and the execution of the same is expressly or by implication of law admitted by
the pleadings, there is no issue upon which evidence in proof of the
written instrument may be introduced: Id.
EXECUTION.

See Market Overt.
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FEIGNED ISSUE.

Tral- Verdict.-If no error was committed upon the trial of a
feigned issue, the objection that the verdict is against evidence cannot
be madp available for a new trial: McKinley v. Lamb, 64 Barb.
Whether a testator declared a paper to be his last will in the hearing
of the witnesses, and whether he requested them to sign it as witnesses,
are questions of fact specially belonging to the jury, and their verdict
should not be interfered with if there was no error of law on the part
of the court: Id.
On the trial of a feigned issue the facts are expressly to be found by
the jury. It seems hardly consistent, when the issue is sent to a jury
to be tried, that the court should direct a verdict on matters of law.
Such questions should be submitted to the court on the application for
judgment upon the verdict: Id.
FORMER ACTION.

Pleading.-A plea of former adjudication, showing that the questions,
things, rights, and matters in suit have been adjudged and tried before
and by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, is good on demurrer: State
ez rel. Cbmbs v. Eudson, 37 Ind.
Where the record upon which a plea of former adjudication is based,
showing judgment against the defendant by default, only shows service
of process on him by recitals in the record, without containing a copy
of the notice and return of service, it may be shown that no jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant was acquired by proper service: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE or.

See Vendor.

HIGHWAY.

Obstruction-Law of the Road.-A traveller, who in meeting another
turns to the left, but does not thereby occasion injury to any one but
himself, is not a violator of law, and is not barred from maintaining an
action against a town to recover for injuries sustained in consequence of
an obstruction on the left hand side of the highway, with which he is
thereby brought in contact: Gale v. Lisbon, 52 N. H.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Mortgage-Pleading.

Married Women-Endorsement of Note.-A married woman may,
with the consent of her husband, transfer her title to a promissory
note, and for that purpose may endorse such note, but she cannot bind
herself by the contract to a liability on the note: Mforeau et UX. v.
.Branson, 37 Ind.
Divorce- Custody of £Vi7dren.-In granting a divorce, the court has
the power to decree the custody of the minor children, or any of them,
to the party most suitable, considering the sex and age of the children
and qualification of the parties: Bush v. Bush, 37 Ind.
It is the duty of the court on granting a divorce, where there is property, to make reasonable provision for the care and custody of any
children of the marriage: Id.
Where there is an estate of twenty thousand dollars, accumulated
during the marriage by the joint efforts of husband and wife, a fourth
in value given to the wife is not unreasonable, where the divorce is
granted for the misconduct of the husband: Id.
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Divorce-Evidence to prove Adultery.-In an action by a husband
against his wife, for divorce on the ground of adultery, a letter from the
alleged paramour of the defendant to her, written during or immediately
after the time of the alleged adulterous intercourse, and which was intercepted by the plaintiff, and never came to the knowledge or possession of the defendant, is not admissible in evidence against the wife;
whether it confesses the adultery, or discloses a state of feeling towards
her tending to prove it: Hobby v. Hobby, 64 Barb.
Nor is such letter admissible as evidence to contradict the writer's
testimony as a witness: Id.
JUDGMENT.

Corredtion.-Where a judgment by default has been entered for a
sum too small, as appears on the face of the' papers, through an error
of the clerk, the judgment may be corrected, on motion, at a subsequent
term, although the amount for which it has been erroneously entered
'Ind.
has been paid: Sherman v. Nixon et al., 87
Sufficient Recital.-An entry on the docket of a justice of the peace
in these words: "Parties appeared ready for trial, after hearing the
evidence the court decides in favor of the plaintiff, against the defendant,
costs taxed to defendant $6.85," is not a suicient recital of a judgment
for the restitution of premises: Wickersham v. Corlew, 10 Kans.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Lease.-Where a lease is under seal, a parol agreement to terminate
it and accept another person as tenant, without an actual surrender.
is not sufficient to terminate the first lease, where the unexpired term
is more than a year: Wilson v. Lester et al., 64 Barb.
Nor will the mere receipt of rent from the iassignee of the lease have
that effect, where there is no proof of the surrender of the premises,
and an acceptance of the assignee as tenant: Id.
Lis PENDENS.

See Action.

MARKET OVERT.

Sheri 's Sale.-A sheriff's sale of personal property of A., upon an
execution against B., vests no title in the purchaser: Bryant v. Whitcher, 52 N. H.
The English law in relation to sales in market overt has never been
adopted in New Hampshire: Id.
See Husbandand Wife-fortgae-Pleadinq.
MARRIED WOMAN.
MORTGAGE.

6attel.-An agreement or understanding between a mortgagor and
mortgagee of chattels, though made after the execution of the mortgage, that the mortgagor may sell the mortgaged property, or a part of
it, on his own account, renders the mortgage void as to creditors, and
such agreement or understanding will be proved by evidence that the
mortgagor did so sell with the knowledge of the mortgagee, and without objection on his part: Putnam v. Osgood, 52 N. H.
PARTNERSHIP.

See Attorney; Evidence.

PLEADING. See Action.
Duplicity-Demurrr.-Areplication is not subject to the charge of
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duplicity unless it sets up two or more answers to the matter relied on
as a defence in the plea; but as many separate and independent facts
and circumstances may be stated in it as are necessary to make a perfect answer to the plea: Hunt v. Haven, 52 N. H.
The demandant counted on his own seisin without stating title. The
defendants pleaded that the plaintiff claimed by a particular title, setting it out, and alleged matter in estoppel. The plaintiff replied, answering and avoiding the estoppel, and the defendants demurred to the
replication for duplicity. Held, that there must be judgment against
the defendants,-first, because the replication was held good; and second, because, however the replication might be, the defendants had
committed the first error in pleading,-their plea to the declaration
being bad in substance, and not cured by pleading over: Id.
Suit against Married Woman.-The plaintiff declared against Mrs.
Riley, the defendant, upon a promissory note, as having been signed
by her jointly with one James L. Riley, her husband, then in full life,
but since deceased. Upon demurrer, held, that the declaration was insufficient, and that the plaintiff must go further, and set forth such
facts and circumstances as will show her liable, notwithstanding her
coverture : Wellcome v. Riley, 52 N. H.
RECErVER.
The fact that a receiver has been discharged is no answer to a motion
for leave to bring an action against him to recover the possession of
property where it appears that the claimants of the property had no
notice of the motion to discharge the receiver, although he was aware
of their claim; and that the receiver has sold the property claimed,
after notice of the claim and after the service upon him of a petition
and notice of motion for leave to prosecute: Xiller v. Loeb et al., 64
Barb.
Set-off against.-Where, after the commencement of a foreclosure
suit, in the name of a bank, by its attorneys, a receiver of the bank is
appointed, such appointment vests in the receiver the title to the mortgage, free from any right of set-off by the attorneys, of a claim for their
services in that action. And if, upon a sale of the mortgaged premises.
the proceeds come into the hands of the attorneys, they are received
for the receiver, and not for the bank; and debts due the from the
bank cannot be interposed against the receiver's title to such proceeds:
The Bowling Green Savings Bank v. Todd et al., 64 Barb.
SET-OF.

See Attorney; Receiver.
SHIPPER-

Duty and Liability to Carriers.-There is an implied duty on the
part of the shipper of goods of a dangerous character (such as nitroglycerine) to give notice of their dangerous nature to the shipowners,
or the person who receives the goods in their behalf; and the omission
to perform that duty is an act of negligence which renders the shipper
liable for the consequences: Barney, Pres't., &c., v. Burnstenbinder, 64
Barb.
In case of a shipment of goods of a dangerous character without such
notice to the carriers, the fact that the omission of the shipper's agent
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to give such notice is a criminal,or at least An illegal act, will not -elieve the principal from liability for it, in a civil action, for damages : Id.
SURETY.

Release.-Where a surety on a promissory note, after his release
from liability, by an extension of time given to the principal without
his consent, receives an indemnity against his liability, without the
knowledge of the holder, and subsequently surrenders the same to the
principal, he may still avail himself of his discharge: Rittenhouse v.
Zemp et al., 37 Ind.
The fact that the surety returned such indemnity, without the knowledge of the holder of the note, at a date anterior to a new extension
of time being given without the consent of the surety, does not render
the latter liable, where the holder of the note had no information in
regard to the indemnity having been given to the surety, when he extended the time of nayment: Id.
USURY.
ioans byforlqn Banks.-An isolated transaction of loaning money,
in this state, by a foreign bank upon the note of the borrower, dated
and payable here, is not necessarily a violation of the statute against unauthorized banking. It is not every loan made in this state by a foreign
corporation which is prohibited: The Hackettstown National Bank v.
Rea, 6 Barb.
When the maker and endorser of a note reside in New York, and the
note is drawn, dated and payable here, the 1laws of New York must
govern as to the rate of interest. If iA be drawn with interest the
rate will be seven per cent. ; if drawn without specifying interest the
same rate of discount must be legal: Id.
And where such note is discounted by a New Jersey bank the statute
of New Jersey, limiting the rate of interest to six per cent., does not
render the note usurious and void, when discounted at seven per cent.:
Id.
A clause in the charter of a foreign bank providing that such bank
shall not take more "than the legal rate of interest for the time being,"
is but a clause inserted for greater security, and does not alter the legal
rate, or make that illegal which would otherwise be legal: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Delivery-PartPayment.-Where, upon a sale of chattels, anything
remains to be done before the sale can be considered as complete, no
title passes to the vendee until delivery and acceptance: Walrath v.
Ingles, 64 Barb.
To constitute a payment as earnest, or a part payment, within the
meaning of the Statute of Frauds, there must be an actual transfer or
delivery of the thing or the money agreed to be given as earnest or part
payment: Id.
The statute requires it to be paid at the time of the contract. A delivery of the thing afterwards, without acceptance, cannot operate to
take the principal contract out of the Statute of Frauds: Id
WILL.

See Feigned Issue.

